UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 17
Issue 1 Journal of Computer & Information Law
- Fall 1998

Article 6

Fall 1998

An Attempt to Rationalize Floppy Disc Claims, 17 J. Marshall J.
Computer & Info. L. 183 (1998)
Richard H. Stern

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard H. Stern, An Attempt to Rationalize Floppy Disc Claims, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 183
(1998)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol17/iss1/6
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized
administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

AN ATTEMPT TO RATIONALIZE

FLOPPY DISK CLAIMS
by RICHARD H.
I.

STERNt

INTRODUCTION

It is now more than four years since the Federal Circuit's en banc
decision in In re Alappat.1 It is now at least two years since the intertwined events of the Federal Circuit's curious decisions to remand in In
re Beauregard2 and In re Trovato,3 and the publication by the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") of its Guidelines on the examination of
software-related patent applications. 4 Despite that passage of time, the
clarity of the legal status of software-related patents, and particularly
those written in article of manufacture format (so-called floppy disk pat5
ents), has not improved.
Nonetheless, use of such claims in patent applications is said to have
become pervasive, in the wake of the PTO's concession to the Federal
Circuit in the Beauregard case that computer programs embodied in a
tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter
... and must be examined .... 6 As a result, counsel and industrial organizations trying to make business decisions on the basis of advice from
t Professorial Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University Law School. Of
counsel, Ablondi, Foster, Sobin & Davidow, Washington, D.C. The author thanks the Oracle Corporation for its generosity in providing a grant to prepare this manuscript.
1. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
2. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
3. In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(vacated).
4. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478
(1996) (hereinafter Guidelines) (the Guidelines, in slightly abbreviated form, are now re-

printed in the

PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT

EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (6th ed., 2d. rev., July 1996) (hereinafter MPEP) and in this
Symposium Issue, 17 J. MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L. 311 (1998)).
5. See Victor Siber and Marilyn S. Dawkins, Claiming Computer-Related Inventions
As Articles of Manufacture, 35 IDEA 13 (1994). The term "floppy disk patent" is defined or
otherwise described with greater particularity infra note 7 and accompanying text. For the
moment, the term may be understood to mean a patent claim to a floppy disk on which a
computer program has been encoded.
6. Beauregard, 53 F.3d. at 1583.
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counsel are left without a proper basis for making sound predictions as to
patentability and potential infringement liability in regard to floppy disk
patents. This has lessened security of business expectation in one of the
most important areas of technology. This, in turn, is a most undesirable
state of affairs, which necessarily affects investment, technological advance, and industrial progress adversely.
A.

WHAT IS A FLOPPY DISK PATENT?

Broadly speaking, a floppy disk patent claims a computer algorithm,
or a computer program implementing an algorithm, as an article of manufacture. The article of manufacture is a computer readable storage medium or device, such as a floppy disk. 7 A floppy disk patent, however, is
only one form of software-related patent in article of manufacture format. In many or most cases, any storage medium or device is equivalent
to a floppy disk for purposes of storing and claiming software, and claims
of this type are typically worded to embrace any and all storage media
and devices. Other possible information storage media that could play
the same role as a floppy disk in this context include a read-only memory
("ROM"), such as a semiconductor ROM chip or an optical disk ("CD"), a
dynamic random-access memory ("DRAM") chip, a tape, a magnetic core,
a set of punched cards, or a hologram. The design choice among such
expedients is ordinarily dictated by engineering and business considerations such as cost, required access speed and data transfer rate, whether
the stored information must be modified and thus placed in a rewritable
medium, stability and durability of the medium or device, presence of
adverse environmental factors, space and weight limitations, and
7. Siber & Dawkins, supra note 5, at 14, and related text. Based on the analysis of
Siber & Dawkins, one might adopt as a paradigm for this kind of claim a format such as the
following:
An article of manufacture comprising a computer usable medium having computer
readable program code means embodied therein for such and such an intended
field of use, the computer readable program code means comprising:
a first computer readable program means for causing a computer to effect
[function A];
a second computer readable program means for causing the computer to
effect [function B], coupled to said first computer readable program
means;
a third computer readable program means for causing the computer to
effect [function C], coupled to said first [and/or second] computer readable
program means ....
Id.
Siber & Dawkins also propose another claim format having process steps rather than
apparatus means as elements. Id. at 14-15. The two formats appear to be functionally
equivalent. Id. See also In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated on
other grounds, 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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whether information security is a concern.8
B.

SoME FLOPPY

DISK PATENT ISSUES AND THE SCOPE OF

THIS ARTICLE

Either literally, because the claims drafter uses a generic term such
as "computer-readable storage medium or device," or by reason of the
doctrine of equivalents, the scope of a floppy disk claim is likely-at least
facially-to extend to any conceivable way to store any program implementing a given algorithm, and such storage is ordinarily a prerequisite
to any use of the algorithm. That raises the same kind of question about
preempting all practical use of the given algorithm that has attended the
patenting of algorithms as such. 9
There is a great deal that could be said about whether algorithms
should be patentable, and many different ways in which one could address this state of affairs. One way is exemplified in the contribution to
this symposium by my former student and now academic colleague, Professor Jay Thomas. 10 His approach points out the fallacies of the legal
reasoning advanced in support of floppy disk patents, that they interact
badly with the main body of patent law, and the many problems their
existence would or will cause for the users and clients of our patent system. Another approach is to study in detail the economic justifications
argued in support of floppy disk patents and analyze whether they are
sound and well-considered-or mere sophistry, insupportable by logic,
empirical data, or common sense. Still another approach is to examine
floppy disk patents as an epiphenomenon of a new intellectual property
imperialism, and comment on the likely effect of such patents on the
legal cultures and economic growth of developing countries on which
they might be foisted. I propose to follow none of these ambitious approaches, having said so many of these things (particularly the first) for
such a long time that I have lost interest in hearing myself say them
again, at least for the time being. For purposes of the present article, I
will assume, arguendo, that time's arrow and entropy considerations
counsel against pursuing any of these courses-the metaphor being that
the bell is rung, the energy from it has moved far outward and slightly
warmed a thousand pebbles, and it is now infeasible to try to unring the
bell.
8. See, e.g., MARTIN L. SHOOMAN, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING: DESIGN, RELIABILITY, AND

MANAGEMENT 207-8 (1983) (discussing how limiting factors of applications affect choices
among storage media).
9. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972), explained in Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-86 (1981).
10. John D. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims
Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. OF COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219 (1998).
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This article has a more modest and limited scope. But before getting
to that, let me emulate Aristophanes telling you about the abuse with
which he is not going to load Euripides and what he is not once again
going to belabor Cleon about. Let me first tell you some more of the
problems about floppy disk patents that I am not going to tell you about
in this article.
The concept of floppy disk claims has spread beyond tangible storage
media and devices to "propagated signal" claims. This means a claim to
an ephemeral, supposed article of manufacture consisting of a propagated signal embodying a computer program. Some observers believe
that software will be widely distributed in the future by Internet rather
than only by distribution of tangible storage media. They have therefore
proposed claiming a signal embodying a computer readable program
code, to capture the full economic reach of commerce in software. The
PTO appears willing to accept claims in signal format, at least in principle, on the ground that they are the result of human agency rather than
natural forces (as would be, for example, a signal resulting from a bolt of
lightning), and are therefore patentable subject matter." Even putting
doctrinal problems aside, 12 claims to computer program algorithms as
11. See Nancy J. Linck & Karen A. Buchanan, PatentProtectionfor Computer-Related
Inventions: The Past, the Present,and the Future, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 659, 67778 (1996). That human agency causes a result does not necessarily make the process or its
result statutory subject matter. Id. For example, human agency caused the results in
Gottschalk v. Benson and In re Schrader, and nonetheless there was no statutory subject
matter. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir.
1994). Some results of human agency are statutory subject matter and some are nonstatutory subject matter. Id. The principle distinguishing the two kinds of subject matter is
more subtle than whether human agency is present (i.e., whether they were "made by man
under the sun"). See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). The appropriate
principle appears to involve drawing the same kind of line of demarcation for elements
along a continuum as is done in distinguishing idea and expression. See Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879) (copyright case); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
498 (1874) (patent case). This demarcation exercise requires the establishment of a
method for distinguishing between an unduly abstract and thus sweeping characterization
of a technological advance (impermissible for purposes of granting intellectual property
rights because overbroad and thus prejudicial to competition and the interests of the public) and an unduly concrete, specific, and narrow characterization of the advance (potentially providing insufficient incentives to promote technological progress and thus
prejudicial to the interests of the public). Id.
12. Determining where signals should be positioned among the present statutory
classes (machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, and processes) of § 101 is a formidable problem. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Proponents of propagated signal claims
favor the article of manufacture pigeonhole, even though there appears to be no precedent
for patenting an intangible (as well as ephemeral) "article of manufacture." Id. In testimony before Congress, the late P.J. Federico, a draftsman of the 1952 Patent Act recodification, stated that "[Under § 101 a person may have invented a machine or manufacture,
which may include anything under the sun that is made by man.. . ." Chakrabarty,447
U.S. at 309 (citingHearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. On
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articles of manufacture, whether as tangible or intangible means for embodying the programs, greatly expand the scope of patent infringement
liability. They do so by substituting direct infringement 13 liability for
contributory' 4 or induced 15 infringement liability. The big difference is
that liability for direct infringement is strict; no requirement of knowledge or intent exists for liability to attach. 16 In contrast, one must be a
knowing infringer to be liable for contributory or induced infringement. 1 7 A retailer that sold a floppy disk containing patented software,
without knowledge of any underlying patent and without other conduct,
would not be liable for infringement of an apparatus or process claim
covering the software. But the same retailer would in the same circumstances be liable for infringement of a floppy disk claim on the software.
An Internet access provider or telephone carrier that transmitted a signal embodying patented software, without knowledge of any underlying
patent and without other conduct, would not be liable for infringement of
an apparatus, process, or floppy disk claim covering the software. But
the same service provider would in the same circumstances be liable for
infringement of a propagated signal claim covering the software.
Signal claims can create "accident" problems for telecommunications
carriers and Internet access providers far in excess of those which floppy
disk claims (which they are less likely to infringe, absent any intermedithe Judiciary,82d Cong. (1951) (statement of P.J. Federico)). But perhaps this definition is
too broad to be taken seriously. Id. Thus, even when the Supreme Court's opinion in Diamond v. Diehr stated this dictum, in practically the next breath the Court qualified it by
stating that not every discovery is embraced within the patent statute and that physical
phenomena and abstract ideas were examples of subject matter excluded from patent protection. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-85 (1981); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Despite the oft-quoted statement . . . Congress did not so mandate."); Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("There are, however, substantial qualifications to the apparent sweep of
this statement."); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Obviously, moreover, all things outside the technological arts, such as jokes, puns, law
review articles, business schemes, and Mafioso made men, are unpatentable even if made
under the sun by men. Id. Whether signals containing information in the form of computer programs are statutory subject matter requires a more detailed method of inquiry
than quickly repeating mantras lifted from the Book of Ecclesiastes. NEW AMERICAN STANDARD BIBLE, THE OPEN BIBLE EDITION 611 (1977) ("The words of the Preacher, the son of

David, king in Jerusalem. 'vanity of vanities,' says the Preacher, 'Vanity of vanities! All is
vanity.' What advantage does man have in all his work [wihich he does under the sun?"
Eccl. 1:1-3).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994).
16. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997); Jurgens
v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
17. See generally Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476
(1964).
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ate storage) create for them. While a judicially crafted exception for Internet transmissions has been proposed as to copyright infringement,' 8
similar judicial legislation for patent infringement claims appears unlikely to occur. This article does not attempt to address the new liability
problems that signal claims or floppy disk claims will create for firms in
portions of the chain of distribution of software products previously untroubled by such issues.' 9 The article also does not attempt to discuss
whether the legal recognition of floppy disk or propagated signal claims
will tend to create greater concentration in the software industry. This
may occur if retailers, service providers, and others involved as intermediates in software distribution become unwilling to deal with new,
small firms that may be unable to assure indemnification for patent infringement liability that they cause intermediates to incur unknowingly.
This article addresses none of those problems. Perhaps, others will
try to address them.20 In my view, floppy disk patents must be regarded
as a bad idea whose time has now come (just as railroad time irreversibly
replaced steamboat time). It is therefore less useful to argue that their
defects should bar their being allowed than it would be to seek ways to
minimize the harmful impact of their defects. This article, accordingly,
addresses how we should and should not allow floppy disk claims to be
written, based on considerations of best furthering the policy goals of the
patent system.
There is now an impasse. Unless appropriate preventive measures
are adopted, we are in for a great deal of litigation and uncertainty over
floppy disk patent claims because they have been left formless and rudderless. Any claim drafter can write anything, and the PTO has become
demoralized over its losses or perceived losses. As a consequence, it has
abdicated responsibility on the theory that its "customers" want floppy
disk patents-never mind what the claims say. 2 1 But the PTO's custom18. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications, Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that contributory or induced infringement standards should
apply to what otherwise would be direct copyright infringement by Internet access providers). See also H.R. 3209, 105th Cong. (1998) (bill proposing limitation of Internet access
providers' liability for copyright infringement). Arguably, an Internet access provider that
caches a transmission of a computer program "makes" as well as "reproduces" the subject
matter of any underlying intellectual property and thus infringes multiple rights. Id.
19. See Richard H. Stem, On Defining the Concept of Infringementof Intellectual Property Rights in Algorithms and OtherAbstract Computer-RelatedIdeas, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 400,
445-50 (1995) (providing a brief discussion of software distributors' liability problems).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1994) (one area particularly deserving attention is amendment
of the statute to excuse innocent infringement in this field. Consider, for example, how
Congress fine-tuned the legislation to cause the importation of a product of a patented process patent infringement by conditioning liability on culpable conduct). See 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(b) (1994).
21. Some PTO officials have been quoted as saying that "most of the PTO's customers
applauded" the Guidelines as a big step in the right direction.
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ers, at least its corporate customers, are just as often potential mulctees
as they are potential mulctors. Moreover, even the general public is a
customer of the PTO, 2 2 although some may have lost sight of that at
times. Needed here is a mechanism for issuing only those floppy disk
claims that serve the interests of all of the customers of the PTO, by
recognizing the statutory policies of the patent act.
This article proposes an analytic framework for determining the patentability of novel and nonobvious advances sought to be claimed as
software patents in article of manufacture format. The article focuses
largely on the problems of how to confine the scope of such claims appropriately to the enabling disclosures and descriptions on which they are
based, how to make such claims particularly and distinctly point out the
nature and scope of the claimed invention, and how to limit the liability
for infringing such claims to cases in which the accused infringer has
actually taken the enabled and described subject matter. To accomplish
these results, the article proposes adoption of administrative regulations
establishing specific mechanisms-conditions and formats for article of
manufacture claims in software patents. In the alternative, the article
proposes that the same results can be accomplished by a similar statutory amendment enacting the proposed mechanisms.
II. BACKGROUND
Some preliminary explanation of how we came to the present impasse is in order. Since almost the inception of our patent system, inventors and their counsel have been testing the limits of what they can claim
relative to what they have disclosed. The landmark case of O'Reilly v.
Morse23 is illustrative. Morse invented a particular telegraphic apparatus, the so-called repeater circuit, that overcame the problem of noise
degrading signal, which his predecessors had been unable to overcome
with their devices. 2 4 Morse claimed that apparatus in his earlier claims,
and in his notorious Claim 8 he further claimed the use of electromotive
22. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948) ("the public
interest comes first") (concurring opinion of J. Douglas); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) ("It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent
system.") (collecting authorities); Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard Marine & Mfg. Co., 315
U.S. 759, 768 (1942). The importance to the patent system and its customers of business
certainty and avoidance of needless litigation is the stated basis for the Court's decision in
CardinalChemical Company. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100-02
(1993).
23. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
24. The repeater circuit is a cascade of relays, in which each closure of a relay contact
provides the current for the coil that closes the next relay farther down the cascade. In
effect, this is a series of nonlinear amplifiers, each providing a new "1"to the next amplifier
before the existing signal "1" becomes indistinguishable from a "0" because of noise. The
Supreme Court called this a "plan for combining two or more electric or galvanic circuits,
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force to send and mark a message of intelligible characters or signs at
any distance. He thus claimed, and preempted although he did not enable, the teletype, fax machine, television, transmission from a space satellite to Earth of digitized astronomic images, and many other devices
and processes not invented until decades or more later (the Morse controversy occurred about 150 years ago).
The Supreme Court upheld Morse's claims to his particular apparatus but held Claim 8 invalid on two grounds. One was that Claim 8's
scope exceeded Morse's enabling disclosure. The other ground was that,
as a matter of law, Morse did not invent or discover the use of electromagnetic force to transmit intelligible signs at any distance. That was
such an abstract and intangible characterization of the subject matter in
controversy that it was an unpatentable idea rather than a patentable
concrete embodiment of the idea. 25 Rather, Morse invented only a particular apparatus for electrically transmitting intelligible characters in a
particular way.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT'S TRILOGY ON STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER

The same issues came to a head in a series of Supreme Court decisions over a decade beginning in the early 1970s. In the trilogy of decisions, Gottschalk v. Benson,2 6 Parker v. Flook, 27 and Diamond v.
Diehr,28 the Court established two complementary principles: An algorithm or computer program, as such, is not statutory subject matter
and is therefore unpatentable. 29 But an industrial machine or process
that merely utilized an algorithm or computer program, among other
things, is statutory subject matter and patentable if novel and nonobvious. 30 These decisions carry forward both branches of the earlier reasonwith independent batteries for the purpose of overcoming the diminished force of electromagnetism in long circuits." Cardinal Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 109.
25. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (having held a comparable decision with
respect to copyright in ideas versus copyright in tangible expressions of ideas). See also 17
U.S.C. § 102(b), which codifies the distinction between idea and expression. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1994). See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995),
affd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (providing recent examples of the
application of copyright law to computer software); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693 (2d Cir. 1992).
26. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
28. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
29. As Justice Stevens expressed the concept for the Court in its Flook decision, an
algorithm is a process in the ordinary sense of that word, but it is not the kind of process
that the statute makes patentable. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593. See also In re Grams, 888 F.2d
835, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining the algorithm process aspect of Flook).
30. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (addressed criteria for obviousness of such
claimed inventions, without reaching the issue of statutory subject matter). Johnston in-
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ing in the Morse case.
B.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASE LAW UP TO

1994

Decisions of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor courts built on
this distinction and addressed some of its ramifications. By about 1994,
a set of criteria had begun to take form that distinguished statutory (i.e.,
patentable) subject matter from nonstatutory (i.e., unpatentable) subject
matter in this field. The line of demarcation was not a simple, straight,
bright line but, although somewhat jagged and convoluted, and a little
dim in some places, it seemed comprehensible enough to provide business certainty.
In the case of an apparatus, or what purported to be an apparatus, 3 1
volved a computer program or computerized procedure for performing certain financial
transactions. Id. The government contended that the claim was directed to an algorithm
or a method of doing business and was therefore nonstatutory subject matter. Id. The
Court merely decided that the subject matter was obvious over the prior art. Id.
31. A software patent may purport to be directed to an apparatus. For example, consider this claim: "An apparatus comprising a first means for squaring the length of a first
side of a right triangle, a second means for squaring the length of a second side of the right
triangle, a third means for producing a sum of the results produced by the first and second
means, and a fourth means for extracting the square root of the sum, whereby is provided a
quantity equal to the length of the hypotenuse of the right triangle." To be sure, this claim
styles itself as an apparatus. Is self-designation determinative? Consider this exchange:
"Call me a taxi." "OK, you're a taxi." Moreover, a combination of means is nominally an
apparatus. Nonetheless, the foregoing claim is only an "illusory apparatus." The claim is
directed to the Pythagorean Theorem and thus nonstatutory subject matter, except in the
most extraordinary circumstances. Such an apparatus may readily be appreciated by considering the notional specification supporting this notional patent claim.
The claim may have either of two specifications supporting it. The first specification
discloses only conventional implementing apparatus, such as a conventional ladder and a
conventional squaring means, or it simply states that conventional expedients for implementing these functions are well known to those of skill in the art. This specification is
ordinarily what one finds in reported cases on software patents. The claim supported by
this specification is either obvious or directed to nonstatutory subject matter, depending on
the conceptual pigeonhole you prefer. The reason why this specification is either obvious or
directed to nonstatutory subject matter is that it recites only a sequence of calculations
concededly carried out by conventional means. No novelty is asserted for anything but the
combination of conventional means and nonstatutory subject matter, "considered as a
whole." Considered as a whole, zero plus zero always equals zero, as Justice Stevens suggested in Flook. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). The subject matter should be considered unpatentable under § 101, because the alleged inventor does not even purport to have
invented an intrinsically "new" apparatus. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Or perhaps it is
preferred to utilize the methodology of the majority in Diehr, and its utilization of a presumptive rule of obviousness under § 103 for such claims. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981).
Either way, a defendant in a patent infringement case based on such a claim should
not be obliged as a matter of course to hazard a free-ranging factual investigation of
whether this subject matter is somehow not obvious when considered as a whole. (The case
should be dismissed on motion, the way courts routinely dismiss antitrust conspiracy
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the apparatus was statutory subject matter if the algorithm/computer
program was carried out in a computer interconnected to other machinery or devices, such as a sensor/transducer, at the input end of the whole
claimed system. 32 The other machinery could also be a mechanical device, such as an automatic rubber mold opener, located at the output
claims when it is no more plausible that the defendant conspired than it is that the defendant acted out of unilateral self interest). See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Should the presumption of obviousness, if one operates under that mode of analysis
rather than that of § 101, be rebuttable? See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Perhaps, one theoretical possibility exists for lack of obviousness. Ordinarily, the idea of computerizing a known
procedure is an obvious expedient; at times, failure to consider it might be regarded as a
form of malpractice. But it is conceivable that some exception might exist. Unless a patentee could show that computerizing a claimed procedure was not obvious, however, summary judgment or its PTO equivalent should issue against a claim of this type. (A
comparable rule exists for information printed on paper medium. Such claimed subject
matter is presumed obvious unless the patent applicant shows that the information and its
substrate functionally interact in a novel manner that would not have been obvious to
those in the art). See In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The theoretical possibility that some patentees might prove it nonobvious for them to have decided to computerize
a known procedure should not provide a justification, however, for software patentees to
force defendants to a full-blown trial under a presumption of nonobviousness and a generalized, unfocused inquiry into obviousness.
Now, what of the second notional specification? By hypothesis, the second specification
discloses a novel, nonobvious means for squaring and/or adding. This specification, however, is a figment of an overheated imagination. I have never seen such a patent in the
reported cases, and those who wish to spin legal theories based on the need to protect such
inventors fully are invited to point to examples of such inventions among the case reports.
The reason that one finds only examples of the first class among reported decisions on
software patents is simple: anyone who invented a new way to square or add would claim
the new way, as such, rather than claim use of the new way for the very limited purpose of
carrying out the Pythagorean Theorem. The first one would be a much more valuable patent, and the second one would be a trivial increment if one had the first one.
There is another way in which a software patent may purport to be directed to apparatus, which is much more difficult to address satisfactorily. This occurs when enough hardware trappings are inserted into a claim to create doubt over whether the claim recites
more than just a programmed, off-the-shelf microprocessor chip. This occurs when a claim
drafter adopts an expedient such as inserting the phrase "hard-wired TL combinatoriallogic" before one or more instances of the word "means" in a claim similar to that of the first
paragraph of this note. See Ex parte Akamatsu, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1915 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int.
1992). That is to say, in a manner of speaking, "I claim the Pythagorean Theorem carried
out by means of conventional hardware circuitry." Must this be addressed under § 103
rather than § 101? See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1994). If nothing else, § 103's mode of inquiry is a far more expensive one. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
But all of the foregoing is only background to the controversy over article of manufacture claims addressed in this paper. The foregoing problems concern the apparatus claims
to which the article of manufacture claims addressed in this paper relate. This article
leaves such problems to others. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 10, passim (addressing how
to solve problems with claims in article of manufacture format once you have solved the
other problems in patenting software-as an apparatus or process).
32. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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end 3 3 of the whole claimed system and performing more than insignificant post-solution, responsive activity after utilization of the algorithm.
Apparently, the apparatus could sometimes be pretty flimsy and still
pass muster-for example, an analog-to-digital converter at the input
end 34 or a look-up ROM in the middle. 3 5 A claim considered to be directed to an algorithm, as such, however, without adequate apparatus
36
trimmings, was unpatentable.
In the case of a process, a claim would cover statutory subject matter
if it (i) was limited to a specific apparatus environment, (ii) involved the
transformation of one substance into another, or (iii) involved the manipulation and transformation of electrical signals representative of physical parameters (e.g., temperature, pH, reflected seismic energy, cardiac
muscle electropotential). 3 7 If the court found that the claim did none of
those things, as it did in In re Schrader,the process was unpatentable as
38
nonstatutory subject matter.
C.

ALAPPAT AND AFTERWARDS

The state of the law appeared to destabilize abruptly in mid-1994, in
the wake of the en banc Federal Circuit's Alappat decision. 39 The majority opinion in Alappat was sufficiently cryptic that it was not apparent
which of several things the court had held it patentable to claim. One
possibility, which in retrospect now seems the most likely one, was that a
claim to a differently programmed generic microprocessor interconnected
with various parts of an oscilloscope, and operating under the influence
of an algorithm to smooth a jagged line on a screen display on the oscilloscope, was patentable. Another possibility, however, was that the Alap33. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
34. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (since it is impossible to subject a signal from an analog sensor to processing according to a digital signal processing algorithm without first running the signal through an
analog-to-digital converter, inclusion of an analog-to-digital converter as a claim element
does nothing of substance to affect the scope of the claim or provide or manifest additional

enabling disclosure).
35. See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The ROM provided a scratch
pad for recording parameter values. Id. See also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)
(the Court accorded no weight to a shift register that played a comparable role).
36. For example, some of the claims in In re Abele were held unpatentable on this
algorithm ground while others were upheld because they were sufficiently intertwined with
and limited to a CAT scanner X-ray machine environment. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902
(C.C.P.A. 1982). Accord In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
37. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
38. Id. Schrader involved a system for evaluating bids on multiple lots of items. Id.
There were no apparatus limitations. Id. There was no transformation of one physical
substance into another, and the input signals to the system were representative simply of
the dollar amounts of bids made by different persons. Id.
39. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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pat court had made it possible to claim a differently programmed generic
microprocessor, operating under the influence of the algorithm in question, where the claimed thing might be used with an oscilloscope, or instead might be used in any other machine environment-and where it
might be used to smooth a jagged line on an oscilloscope screen display,
or it might be used to perform whatever other function of which it was
capable anywhere. Still another possibility, although unlikely, was that
the court had held that a differently programmed generic microproces40
sor, without more, was patentable.
The question was resolved in July of 1998, and was reflected some
months ago in the oral argument before the Federal Circuit of a patent
infringement case involving financial software. 4 1 The patentee's counsel
contended that Alappat stood for the proposition that a newly programmed general-purpose digital computer, without more, was statutory subject matter as a "machine." Counsel so argued because the financial data
processing software at issue in the case had been claimed with no further
apparatus limitations. The author of the court's Alappat opinion then
responded to counsel, "That's what you think Alappat held?" Counsel
responded affirmatively, different judges made different grimaces, and
the patent bar now has a vaguely articulated standard for determining
42
the patentability of mathematical algorithms.
Different post-Alappat decisions of Federal Circuit panels have reflected different interpretations of Alappat by different members of the
en banc Alappat court. Thus, in 1994, In re Trovato /43 and In re
Warmerdam 4 appeared to reflect the first interpretation of Alappat.
But In re Lowry 45 appeared to reflect the second interpretation. Then in
1995, in Trovato II, the Federal Circuit mysteriously vacated Trovato I
for reconsideration in the light of the mid-1995 (unadopted) draft of the
PTO's Software-Patent Guidelines. 4 6 Also, in early 1995, in In re Beauregard, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded a PTO decision "for
40. See In re Bernhardt, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
41. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998), rev'g 927 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1995). "The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four categories of subject
matter a claim is directed to-process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matterbut rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical
utility." State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
42. The same colloquy ended with a judge's characterization of counsel's patent as being directed, unlike the Alappat patent, to "nothing but data; data, data, data." The implications of that remark for floppy disk patents are unclear.
43. In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (hereinafter "Trovato1')(vacated); 60
F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (hereinafter "Trovato II").
44. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
45. In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
46. In re Trovato, 60 F.3d 807 (1995).
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further proceedings in accordance with the Commissioner's concessions"
made in arguing for a dismissal of the appeal as moot and for a remand. 4 7 The important concession was "that computer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102 and 103."48 In 1996, the PTO revised the draft Software-Patent
Guidelines and published them in final form. 4 9 Since the adoption of the
Guidelines, the State Street Bank decision represents the Federal Circuit's most recent decision of consequence in the field. Nonetheless, the
events of 1995 and 1996 deserve a recapitulation in more detail.
D.

THE ISSUES IN BEAUREGARD

Beauregard50 had been a test case that might have shed more light
on the issues that this article addresses, but neither the PTO nor the
Federal Circuit was in the mood for another tilt at that windmill in 1995.
In Beauregard, IBM sought to bring before the Federal Circuit its idea
that algorithms (or software inventions, if you prefer) should be claimable in essentially this format: an article of manufacture comprising a
storage medium (e.g., floppy disk) encoded with machine-readable computer program code for carrying out an algorithm. 5 1 The algorithm could
be recited either as a sequence of means for performing various mathe52
matical functions or as the steps of performing the functions.
The PTO Board had held the claims unpatentable under §§ 101 and
103. The grounds were related because they both involved variations on
the "printed matter" rule. The § 101 argument against patents on
printed matter is that a claim to a book, where it is conceded that books
in general are old, and the only assertion of novelty is directed to the new
material (content) printed in the book (or new material conventionally
encoded on a conventional floppy disk, as here), is directed to nonstatutory subject matter. This point is like one made in the Diehr dissent,
where Justice Stevens analyzed Flook as holding that a claim is not directed to the kind of invention covered by § 101 when the inventor con47. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
48. Id.
49. Guidelines, supra note 4.
50. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
51. Siber & Dawkins, supra note 6. (Siber and Dawkins were counsel for IBM in the
Beauregardcase).
52. Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1583. The particular algorithm involved in Beauregard
was a way to fill polygons, a procedure relevant to computer-aided design, font generation,
and other graphics applications. Id. See also Richard H. Stem, Solving the Algorithm Conundrum:After 1994 in the Federal Circuit,Patent Law Needs a RadicalAlgorithmectomy,
22 AIPLA Q.J. 167, 195-203 (1995) (describing the particular algorithm involved in Beauregard and the parties' positions).
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cedes that nothing in the claim is new except for a new algorithm. 53
Judge Archer made a similar point about the unpatentability of a conventional CD encoded with a new song, in his Alappat dissent. 5 4
The § 103 argument against printed matter patents is that no patentable weight can be given to the identity of the information (content) in
a book (or a floppy disk), if that is the only thing about the book (or the
floppy disk) that differs from the prior art. Rather, printed matter can be
nonobvious, and thus patentable subject matter, only if the printed matter interacts with the substrate (e.g., book or floppy disk) in a novel and
55
nonobvious way.
After the PTO Board's decision in Beauregard, the Federal Circuit
decided In re Lowry. 5 6 In that case, a Federal Circuit panel held that the
printed matter rule did not apply to machine-readable material, as distinguished from human-readable material, when the alleged printed
matter was a memory device said to be "structured" in accordance with a
novel "data structure." 57 The Lowry decision made the PTO believe that
the PTO Board's Beauregard opinion was not defensible, because it
rested on the printed matter doctrine. Accordingly, the PTO sought to
have the Beauregardcase remanded to the PTO Board so that the decision could be shored up. It has also been suggested that the PTO was
both convinced that the Federal Circuit would rule against it in Beauregard and that the Justice Department would then refuse to approve an
appeal to the Supreme Court-which made the PTO eager to avoid a
precedential decision in the case.
IBM thought that a remand would not only deprive it of its test case
vehicle, but give the PTO an opportunity to shore up the PTO Board
opinion on other grounds (for example, prior art). IBM therefore opposed
the PTO's remand motion, the first time the PTO made it. IBM argued
that the PTO was hypocritical in asking for a remand on the alleged
grounds that it wanted to reconsider the matter in the light of Lowry
because it "appear[ed]" (the PTO's use of this weak verb clearly displeased IBM) that the rejection was inconsistent with Lowry. 58 Absent a
more abject confession of error by the PTO, IBM contended, it would be
unfair to IBM to remand. The Federal Circuit then denied the PTO's
53. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 211-14 (1981).
54. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545-46 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
55. See In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
56. In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
57. Id. at 1583.
58. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). IBM argued that everyone
knows that the PTO pays no attention to a Federal Circuit panel decision unless it is "a
decision that the Commissioner happens to agree with." Id. IBM said that "appears" and
similar words of qualification belied the PTO's sincerity, and that on remand the PTO
would just reject again, on some basis distinguishing Lowry and limiting it to its facts. Id.
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motion without explanation. The PTO then moved again for a remand,
this time making the concession quoted in the Federal Circuit's order.
The PTO also advised the court that it planned to issue new guidelines to
examiners on how to process computer-related patent applications. This
led to the Federal Circuit's granting the renewed motion for a remand, to
the Trovato II decision, and about one year later to publication of the
59
Software-Patent Guidelines.
E.

THE GUIDANCE FROM THE SOFTWARE-PATENT GUIDELINES

The guidance that the Software-Patent Guidelines give the patent
bar is Delphic, at best. The Guidelines advise practitioners to pay a
great deal of attention to drafting a specification describing at least one
embodiment of the claimed invention fully enough that persons of routine skill in software arts can practice the invention. The Software-Patent Guidelines also tell us in great detail that the PTO will allow claims
of the kind that the Federal Circuit and its predecessor courts had approved before Alappat.60 They also tell us in much detail that the PTO
will refuse to issue patents on conventional CDs encoded in a conventional manner with new songs.
The Guidelines' language on floppy disk claims is very sparse, however. It tells us little more than that the PTO intends in some, unexplained circumstances to allow floppy disk claims, even though there is
no case law specifically addressing them. The Guidelines do not address
the issue of what relation, if any, an allowable floppy disk claim must
have to a claim of the type approved in or before Alappat. In particular,
they do not address the permissible scope of a floppy disk claim, relative
to that of a machine or process claim that was allowable under pre-Alappat case law. Finally, the Guidelines do not address the relationship between the enabling disclosure underlying a floppy disk claim and the
61
field-of-use scope of the claim.
The remainder of this article is directed to an attempt to try to supply some sensible answers to the questions that the PTO left unanswered in the Software-Patent Guidelines.
59. Guidelines,supra note 4.
60. Id. The Guidelines advise us that the PTO considers allowable claims such as
those approved in Abele and Schrader. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re
Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
61. MPEP § 2106.01 discusses enablement and description in abstract terms. MPEP
§ 2106.02 purports to discuss disclosure in "computer programming cases" but in the end
only concludes with this general guideline: an examiner should challenge the sufficiency of
disclosure if the applicant fails to provide "a reasonably detailed flowchart." No specific
comments are made about floppy disk claims, whether they present any special enablement
problems, or whether they should be treated any differently from apparatus or process
claims.
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ANALYSIS

As a preliminary manner, some general principles should be set out
to describe the premises on which this analysis is based. The first is that
the principles codified in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of § 112 of the patent statute 62 should be of paramount concern. To be allowable, a floppy disk
claim should have a scope commensurate with the enabling disclosure
and the description in the specification. 6 3 Moreover, what applies to allowability should apply equally to interpretation of claim scope in patent
infringement actions. If a patentee teaches the world no more than how
to send messages via a telegraphic repeater apparatus, he should not get
a patent on all use of electromotive force for sending a message of intelligible signs at any distance. By the same token, an allowable floppy disk
claim should clearly advertise its scope, in terms of what acts and conduct by others are to be held infringement.
Finally, there is subject matter (such as the Pythagorean Theorem)
that could not be claimed as an allowable process or apparatus under
Alappat and its predecessors, because it is nonstatutory subject matter,
considered as a whole. That kind of subject matter should not be claimable as a floppy disk, either. The rationale for floppy disk patents, to the
extent that there is one, is to make additional persons in the distribution
chain for software technology liable where they previously might have
escaped liability because it was too difficult or expensive to pursue them.
The rationale is not one for making algorithms, as such, patentable subject matter or for otherwise expanding the nature of the kind of advances
64
that can be patented.
The foregoing principles lead to the conclusion that a floppy disk
claim should be allowed only if at least a hypothetical process or apparatus claim would be allowed, directed to the same subject matter. Thus,
suppose that a machine doing act or task X by means including use of a
62. 35 U.S.C. § 112 IT 1-2 (1994).
63. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
64. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). IBM explained the rationale for
floppy disk claims in its briefs in the Beauregard case, and the PTO appears to have accepted them in the concession it stated to the Federal Circuit in that case. Id. As IBM
explained, the reasons for recognizing claims in floppy disk format are twofold:
(1) The floppy disk of Beauregardwas, metaphorically, no more than a "cam" that
operated the computer apparatus that was conceded as patentable, or that activated the computer process that was conceded as patentable. Hence, no additional
real-world claim scope or "monopoly" would be created by allowing this kind of
"subcombination" or cam claim; and
(2) The claim to the floppy disk was needed to facilitate patent infringement suits
against contributory infringers and inducers of infringement of the allowed apparatus and process claims. There was no devious purpose to reach anything wider
or to obtain a broader monopoly than the legitimate monopoly of the apparatus
and process claims.
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given algorithm A, or a computer program Y embodying algorithm A, is
patentable. Then, a floppy disk in which the computer program Y is encoded should be patentable only to the extent that it is directed to the
same task X that the machine patent reaches (recognizing that our focus
is on the information storage medium aspect of the overall system). Beyond that, however, a floppy disk patent should not be allowable. By the
same token, using a floppy disk encoded with Y to perform task Z, where
Z is not equivalent to or a part of X, should not be held to be patent
infringement.
This immediately raises a claim scope problem with which the Alappat court struggled. A patent is ordinarily allowable only when it is directed to an implementation of an idea, rather than to the idea as such. 65
This may be illustrated by a hypothetical invention or discovery of a system for visual pattern recognition (for example, a system for checking a
signature on a check against a genuine signature on file with a bank).
The system uses a camcorder to provide a digitized signal representative
of the signature on a check. This signal is to be compared with that of
the reference signature on file. The pattern recognition procedure uses
convolution integrals, which means that the computational part of the
system needs to carry out many multiplications. 6 6 A problem is that
multiplications use much more computing power than other operations
such as addition and subtraction.
The point in which this hypothetical system departs from prior art is
that the multiplications of the values of various parameters are not carried out in the ordinary, computer resource intensive manner. Instead,
the invention does this in a much less resource intensive manner, by taking advantage of the quarter-square algorithm, a special case of the Binomial Theorem. The special case is that (a+b)2 - (a-b)2 = 4ab. Hence, if
one wants to get the product of two parameters, a and b, one need not go
through the resource intensive process of multiplying a by b. Instead,
one sums a£, looks up in a table 0.25 of the square of the sum; then one
takes the difference a-b, looks up in a table 0.25 the square of the difference; and then one takes the difference of the two quarter-squares. That
difference equals the product ab.
A process or apparatus patent on this hypothetical invention would
undoubtedly have limitations as to the nature and source of the input
signal to the system (which comes from a camcorder that scans the signature on a check), or have some other interconnection of the computational part of the system with mechanical devices. These so-called
structural limitations and interconnections with devices other than the
computational part of the system add concreteness to the claimed subject
65. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874).
66. See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Figure 1. - Machine
System Using
Programmed
Computer

Figure 2. -

Programmed

Computer

matter and at the same time limit the scope of the system's apparatus or
process claims to a particular environment. The specification would
teach enabling use of the system in that environment, but would not
teach its use in other environments unknown to the inventor. It is assumed that this system, considered as a whole, is novel and nonobvious.
The two accompanying figures illustrate the point. A given system
as a whole is shown in each box surrounded by a double line. What is
outside the double line boxes is the external environment. The interior
boxes surrounded by single lines are subassemblies within the given system. In the first, Figure One, the leftmost subassembly is an input device ("Input") such as the previously mentioned camcorder for providing
a digitized representation of a check signature. The digitized signal from
the input device is fed to the middle subassembly, a computer device
(such as a personal computer or a programmed microprocessor chip).
The computer device itself is statutory subject matter but well known
and thus unpatentable per se. It is, however, programmed in accordance
with a notional novel and nonobvious computer program, such as a program for multiplying parameters in accordance with the quarter-square
algorithm. The program is stored in a floppy disk (or ROM) accessible to
the computer device. The rightmost subassembly in Figure One is a
post-solution output device ("Output"), such as a conveyer for moving
valid checks to a subsequent processing location, if the computer procedure determines that the signature is valid. (If the check is a forgery, a
buzzer sounds to summon the bunco squad and/or a device sets in motion
a computerized protest of the check to the previous holder and debits its
account.) This device is operatively connected to the computer device so
that it operates in accordance with the results of the computer device
and its programmed computations.
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Under prevailing case law, the system as a whole is statutory subject matter and is patentable if novel and not obvious. In terms of the
facts of the Alappat case, the system of Figure One may be considered an
oscilloscope system in which the leftmost subassembly feeds signals representative of screen coordinates to the computer device. The computer
device processes them in accordance with a smoothing algorithm, and
provides a control signal to the rightmost subassembly. The latter uses
the control signal to control the intensity of a light beam illuminating the
screen display of the oscilloscope (for example, it controls current amplitude in the neck coil of a cathode ray tube). The assumed facts concerning the hypothetical check verifier device are thus on a par with those of
Alappat. Figure One depicts a machine system that utilizes a programmed computer.
Figure Two, in contrast, lacks the arrows interconnecting the computer device with the input or output devices that flank the computer in
Figure One. Thus, Figure Two could represent the computational unit of
the Alappat case considered in isolation, with nothing but data in and
data out. By the same token, Figure Two could correspond to the computational unit of the check verification system, without the camcorder or
other devices. This device does nothing but multiply input numbers to
produce their product as an output. The system of Figure Two is
equivalent to a personal computer ("PC") into which someone
keypunches numbers, so that a computer program in the PC can multiply them and display their product. The "system" is an old computer
using a new computer program which has "configured the computer into
a new structure." In other words, it is like an old player piano into which
a new piano roll has been inserted 6 7 or an old stereo system whose loud68
speaker is being restructured in accordance with a new CD.
If the proper interpretation of Alappat as a precedent is that the
claimed subject matter in that case was statutory subject matter because
of the interconnection and inter-relationship of the programmed
microprocessor chip and the rest of the oscilloscope, the device of Figure
Two is unpatentable. Depending on how one decides to analyze it, the
subject matter is unpatentable either because it is anticipated or obvious
or because it is nonstatutory subject matter. Only if Alappat is understood to hold that a programmed computer device, by itself, without interconnections to other physical apparatus such as a sensor or automatic
mold opener, is patentable when the computer program is novel and nonobvious, is the device of Figure Two patentable. (This would be
equivalent to holding that any 486 PC that you buy "off the shelf' in a
67. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
68. But see In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); In re Bernhardt, 417
F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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store is a patentable new machine if you take it home, insert into it a
floppy disk containing a new, nonobvious program, and turn the power
on). 69 As already suggested, the first of these interpretations of Alappat
probably represents the better view.
A further problem concerns properly adjusting the scope of a claim
to the supporting disclosure. The check verification system of Figure
One does not have to operate in real time nor within the confines of a
space probe. It therefore does not matter whether the storage medium is
a floppy disk, as indicated in Figure One, or a memory chip, a gate array
chip, or a hologram. That the scope of a so-called floppy disk claim extends to any and all conceivable storage media and devices may well be
immaterial for the check verification field of use. Nonetheless, the same
pattern recognition algorithm that the claim describes and effectively
claims may be useful, also, for detecting locations of SCUD missiles from
aerial photographs, for picking up and assembling components on a conveyor belt in a factory, and for navigating a space vehicle at high speed
through an asteroid belt while being pursued by hostile aliens firing
phasar torpedoes. Some of these applications or fields of use (the last
one, for example) require operation in real time. 7 ° Some of them are subject to ruggedness, size, and weight constraints. It is no more clear that
an enabling disclosure of pattern recognition for check verification purposes should be considered enabling for space vehicle navigation purposes than it was clear that Morse's description of the repeater telegraph
apparatus enabled facsimile machines and television equipment.
This article now undertakes to provide a rationale under which a
claim to the floppy disk of Figure One is patentable and a claim to the
floppy disk of Figure Two is unpatentable. More generally, what rules
should be applied to claims in article of manufacture format to accomplish the result that only those claims that correspond in scope to patentable apparatus or process claims are patentable? At the same time, it is
proposed to utilize the same mechanism for the purpose of tailoring the
scope of article of manufacture claims to the enabling disclosure. That
is, how can a floppy disk claim directed to an application such as the
notional check signature verification system be kept from covering pattern recognition in space vehicle navigation if that is not enabled in the
69. This would also require that Alappat overruled, sub silentio, In re Abele and In re
Schrader,and that In re Warmerdam was subsequently misdecided. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Schrader,
22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
70. See Richard H. Stern & Edward P. Heller III, In re Alappat: The Gordian Knot
Retwisted, 2 BALT. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 187, 208-11 (1994) (discussing enablement issues in
the context of error-correction algorithms for telecommunications and disk-drive read-write
purposes).
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specification but both systems and their storage media use the same pattern recognition algorithm?
A.

APPROACHES TO PROVIDING CLAIM RuLEs

Consider again Figure One and the hypothetical check signature
pattern recognition device. Suppose, for purposes of discussion, that the
computer program can be simplified to describe just one multiplication
operation using the quarter-square algorithm. 7 1 As previously stated, a
camcorder (left subassembly of Figure One) feeds a digitized representation of the signature on a check to the computer. The computer reads the
computer program from the floppy disk, fetches signature reference data
from memory, and makes a multiplication. If the calculation leads to the
conclusion that the signature is valid, the check is automatically passed
into a receiving bin and conveyor for further processing (right subassembly of Figure One). But if the check is a forgery, a buzzer sounds to summon the bunco squad (same right subassembly).
Consider the paradigm that the claims of the Beauregard case suggest for the floppy disk of the foregoing system. 7 2 Following that para73
digm, the format of a floppy disk claim could be as follows:
An article of manufacture comprising a computer usable medium having computer readable program code embodied therein for providing a
product of a first parameter and a second parameter, the computer
readable program code comprising:
means for causing a computer to take the sum of the first parameter
and the second parameter, providing a sum;
means for looking up in a memory coupled to the computer 0.25 of the
square of said sum, providing a sum-square;
means for causing a computer to take the difference of the first parameter and the second parameter, providing a first difference;
means for looking up in a memory coupled to the computer 0.25 of the
square of said first difference, providing a difference-square;
means for causing a computer to take the difference of the sum-square
and the difference-square, whereby is provided the product of the first
parameter and the second parameter.
If a floppy disk claim is allowed in this format, however, it would
appear to be infringed by any multiplication of two parameters using the
71. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (hypothetical case herein patterned
on a simplified version of the facts of Iwahashi).
72. Siber & Dawkins, supra note 5.
73. Id. (I have omitted from the hypothetical claim the couplings among the various
means, to make the claim simpler to read. As is well known to drafters of claims, however,
the knee bone must be connected to the thigh bone, the thigh bone must be connected to the
hip bone, and so on, so that these dry bones will live again for purposes of § 112).
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quarter-square algorithm. This claim is not limited to use of the quartersquare algorithm in a visual pattern recognition system for check signatures, nor to a system having a camcorder input or a conveyor output.
Instead, the claim is infringed by a system for determining the area of a
wall in order to ascertain how much paint is needed to paint it, or for
determining the area of a field to ascertain how much fertilizer one needs
to spread over it, or for determining what the bill should be in a grocery
store if a customer buys three lemons at 25 cents apiece. The computer
and the floppy disk do not "know" what the physical parameters corresponding to a and b are, or what will be done with the resulting product.
The computer program means encoded in the floppy disk is the same,
and works equally well, for any application.
Absent from the proposed floppy disk claim are whatever limitations
about xray CAT scanners, automatic mold openers, electrocardiographs,
and the like (here, for example, a camcorder for taking a digitized visual
image of a signature on a check) that conferred patentability on the related apparatus or process claims to the entire system. It might be argued that § 112, Paragraph 6 will confine the means of the floppy disk
claim to the specification, to obviate any O'Reilly v. Morse problem perceived here. That conclusion would be incorrect. The means of this
floppy disk claim are only means for doing calculations, which will have a
very broad range of equivalents. They are not means for performing a
particular pattern recognition procedure. Typically that would be the
case for any claim of this type. The problem does not conveniently go
away because the means of an infringing calculation must be those of the
specification or their equivalents. The means subject to the limitations
of § 112's Paragraph 6 are those of the part of the specification describing
a calculation rather than those of the part of the74specification describing
the physical function that the system performs.
The same exercise may be repeated using a process step format
rather than the format of a series of means. The following claim illus75
trates that format.
An article of manufacture comprising a computer usable medium having computer readable program code embodied therein for providing a
product of a first parameter and a second parameter, the computer
74. Furthermore, a determined claims drafter could stymie the applicability of § 112
6 by replacing each means term by a comparable generic noun. For example, instead of
means for summing a and b one could have an addition code module for summing them.
See Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a
"detent mechanism" is not a "detent means" for purposes of invoking § 112. In addition, the
claims drafter could use a process claim format, as discussed in the text that follows. Siber
& Dawkins, supra note 5, 14-15.
75. See Siber & Dawkins, supra note 5, at 14-15 (proposing an alternative process format for claims). The claims drafter used both formats in the patent application in the
Beauregard case. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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readable program code causing a computer to perform the following
steps:
taking the sum of the first parameter and the second parameter, providing a sum;
looking up in a memory coupled to the computer 0.25 of the square of
said sum, providing a sum-square;
taking the difference of the first parameter and the second parameter,
providing a first difference;
looking up in a memory coupled to the computer 0.25 of the square of
said first difference, providing a difference-square;
taking the difference of the sum-square and the difference-square,
whereby is provided the product of the first parameter and the second
parameter.
The very same conclusions as to claim scope follow, however. The
subject matter claimed in this article of manufacture claim is not limited
to that of the related process claim, because the elements prescribed in
the Schrader decision 76 are not present in the article of manufacture
77
claim, even if they occur in the related claim to a process.
Moreover, because the article of manufacture claims presented are
not limited in scope to the check signature verification system that has
been described, they are probably not patentably enabled for all of the
things that the claim covers. For example, the specification for a check
signature verification system would probably not contain any enabling
disclosure as to how to provide a leftmost subassembly of Figure One
that was adapted to inputting the dimensions of a field that is to have
fertilizer spread over it, or a rightmost subassembly for metering out and
dispensing the fertilizer in accordance with the area determined by the
multiplication procedure. Furthermore, the specification probably would
not contain a description of the invention corresponding to the claim
scope. Accordingly, the claims would not satisfy the requirements of the
first paragraph of § 112. The overbreadth might also contravene the requirement of the second paragraph of § 112 that the claims must distinctly point out the scope of what the inventor regards the invention to
be.
76. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
77. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For example, the corresponding hypothetical process claim could follow the Schrader paradigm of patentability by referring to
use of a camcorder input sensor apparatus. Id. It could also follow that paradigm by including manipulation and/or transformation of a digitized signal from the camcorder
trained on a check signature. Id. But those elements do not concern the coding of a computer program onto a floppy disk nor do they dictate the particular code used. Id. Hence,
they cannot sensibly be carried over to the article of manufacture claim. Id.
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Besides overbreadth from the public interest and competitive standpoint of O'Reilly v. Morse, these claims have another fault. Typically, the
algorithm of such a claim is known or an obvious variation on prior art.
Thus, the curing algorithm in Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court's
last software patent decision, corresponded to the well-known Arrhenius
Equation for mass action. 78 Accordingly, it is quite likely that a claim in
either of the preceding floppy disk formats would be invalid over the
prior art, absent the kind of limitations that would have conferred patentability over the prior art on the machine or process forms of the claim.
An infringer, particularly one using a floppy disk to carry out the procedure involved for a purpose different from that of the patentee, is likely
to be able to say that she merely copied the prior art or made an obvious
variation on what was already well known and thus in the public domain. A claim in this article of manufacture format may therefore be as
self-defeating for the applicant as it is overbroad from a competitive
standpoint.
B.

STATEMENTS OF INTENDED USE

Some way must be found, if it can be, that will bring the scope of
such a floppy disk claim into a reasonable correspondence with the apparatus or process using the algorithm or computer program embodied in
the floppy disk. To keep a floppy disk claim from being directed to a
nonstatutory algorithm or computer program, as such, to give the claim
a scope supported by its disclosure, and to prevent the claim from being
invalid as reading on the prior art, the claim drafter must find a way to
make the scope of a floppy disk claim correspond to the apparatus or
process claim directed to the use of the floppy disk. Unless those results
can be accomplished, there should not be floppy disk claims.
One possibility is to place a statement of intended use and/or other
environmental limitations in the preamble of the claim to limit the coverage of the claim to a particular field of use, 7 9 to a particular apparatus
environment, or to use in connection with input signals representative of
particular physical parameters. The legal effect of preamble limitations
is debatable.8 0 Ordinarily, "mere" statements of intended use in a pre78. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178 (1981). The algorithm in Flook was one
for carrying out the well-known procedure of smoothing by means of a weighted moving
time average. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See also R. BROWN, SMOOTHING, FORECASTING AND PREDICTION OF DISCRETE TIME SERIES 101-04 (1963).

79. But see Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (holding a field of use limitation insufficient to make
patentable a claim to a numerical calculation procedure).
80. See Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55
F.3d 615, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Much ink . .. has been consumed in debates regarding
when and to what extent claim preambles limit the scope of the claims in which they
appear.").
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amble of an apparatus claim are not considered limitations on the scope
of the claim for purposes of avoiding prior art, since a new use for an old
apparatus does not patentably distinguish the claimed apparatus from
the old apparatus.8 1 Furthermore, mere statements of intended use are
not part of the claim for determining whether it is a multi-means combiby § 112 Paragraph 6, or an impermissible sinnation claim permitted
82
gle-means claim.
On the other hand, sometimes a statement of intended use is not
just "mere." The Federal Circuit recently gave decisive weight to a preamble limitation as to intended use. In Rowe v. Dror,8 3 a claimed "balloon angioplasty catheter" had the same structure as a known, generalpurpose "balloon catheter." The PTO's Board considered the word "angioplasty" in the claim preamble a mere statement of intended use, incapable of patentably distinguishing the device from the prior art, but the
Federal Circuit reversed. It held "angioplasty" to be a distinguishing
limitation on the basis of its review of the entire patent record. The record showed that a balloon angioplasty catheter had to be capable of expanding a stenosis in a constricted coronary artery, although generalpurpose balloon catheters did not need to possess this capability. (Presumably, although unremarked in the court's opinion, this capability
was not an inherent capability of all general-purpose balloon catheters.)84 The Rowe decision, although it may prove limited to its facts,
points to the possibility that the Federal Circuit will, at least in some
cases, consider a field of use limitation in the preamble of an apparatus
claim to be capable of distinguishing the apparatus from a structurally
similar prior art apparatus.
Moreover, the Alappat majority placed considerable weight in determining patentability (in that case, statutory subject matter or not, rather
than novelty as in Rowe) on a use-limitation and apparatus-environment
statement in the claim's preamble.8 5 Finally, a use limitation in a process claim must carry some patentable weight, because § 100(b) of the
81. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 159 (1875); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. USITC,
958 F.2d 1066, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
82. See In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he invention defined is
what follows the word 'comprising' .... ").
83. Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
84. Id. at 480. The court observed: "About the most that can be said for the [reference]
is that it does not describe anything inconsistent with angioplasty procedures. However,
this negative pregnant is not enough to show anticipation." Id.
85. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The statement was that the device
was one "[flor converting vector list data representing sample magnitudes of an input
waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display
means." Id. at 1538-39. The court interpreted this statement to mean that the claimed
device accepted signals from one part of an oscilloscope, processed them, and then sent
illumination intensity signals to another part of the oscilloscope. Id. at 1540-41.
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patent law expressly provides for patents on new uses of old products
and processes. The only way to distinguish a new use of an old process
from the old use of the same process is to state the new use in the claim.
Good reasons thus exist to believe that existing case law, of itself, supports the rationalization of floppy disk claims by appropriate preamble
limitations.
C.

LEGITIMATING PREAMBLE LIMITATIONS BY REGULATION OR STATUTE

While the legal status of a preamble limitation in a floppy disk claim
is uncertain under present law, the PTO's Commissioner could significantly diminish (or even wholly eliminate) that uncertainty by appropriate rulemaking. For reasons that will be developed, the Commissioner
probably has the power to resolve this matter by promulgating an appropriate regulation. In the event that this view of the Commissioner's
power is incorrect, the issue can be resolved by making a comparable
amendment to the patent statute.
1.

Proposed Language-GeneralRecognition of Preamble Limitations
Such a rule or statute might provide the following:
Significance of preamble limitations in certain claims
(a) A use limitation in the preamble of an article of manufacture claim
for a computer-implemented invention shall be given patentable weight
in interpreting the scope of the claim, including its interpretation for
purposes of determining patentability over prior art, enablement, and
description. Similar weight shall be accorded to statements in such
claims of apparatus environment and of physical parameters of which
input signals are representative.
(b) Such a claim shall not be rejected under § 102 merely because the
claimed subject matter has previously been disclosed for a different use,
in a different apparatus environment, or in relation to signals representative of different physical parameters.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), such a claim shall be rejected under
§ 103 if the new use, apparatus environment, or relation to physical parameters is a departure from that which has previously been disclosed
that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, considering the invention as a whole.

Here, subsection (a) provides that a preamble recitation of the kind
of limitation that has conferred patentability on apparatus and process
claims to software-related inventions should receive recognition in the
interpretation of the scope of a floppy disk claim. Subsection (b) emphasizes that giving recognition to such limitations means that examiners
should not reject claims to subject matter so limited as anticipated by
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prior art that does not have the same limitations.8 6 On the other hand,
where it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to refer to
analogous prior art in seeking a solution to a problem, the recitation of a
limitation does not turn such an obvious design choice into a patentable
invention. That is as true, however, of an apparatus or process claim to a
software-related invention-or for that matter, any product or process
claim to any invention-as it is of a floppy disk claim. Accordingly, subsection (c) maintains the customary counterbalance of § 103 to § 102. It
may seem implicit, and therefore superfluous to include this statement,
but its omission might be misunderstood to imply the contrary.
That a patent claim had been examined and allowed pursuant to
such a regulation would almost surely cause a court to interpret the
scope of such a claim against alleged acts of infringement in the light of
the limitation in its preamble.8 7 The circumstances would appear to be
tantamount to those of a prosecution history estoppel.8 8
2.

Same Scope As Related Claims

The proposed regulation or statute is only a first step, however, toward rationalization of floppy disk claim practice. In what specific circumstances should a floppy disk claim be allowed? The entire theory of
allowing these claims is that they are needed to act as a supplement to
ordinary process or apparatus claims directed to the same subject matter. For that reason, it would only be reasonable to limit their allowance
to situations in which the ordinary process or apparatus claims that they
supplement have previously been found allowable.
Therefore, a further regulation or statutory provision should apply
to these claims in order to provide such limitations. The following is one
way to formulate that requirement:
86. As a regulation, this provision would bind examiners, not courts. But for reasons
discussed subsequently, courts would be likely to interpret patents issued under the regulation in the light of the regulation. As a statute, the provision would clearly bind courts
and the PTO alike.
87. The language 'shall be given patentable weight in interpreting the scope of the
claim, including interpretation for purposes of determining patentability over prior art,
enablement, and description" is intended to be broad enough to invoke the principle that a
claim should be interpreted for purposes of infringement no more broadly than it was for
purposes of determining allowability. See, e.g., White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886); In
re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
88. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1573-74 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is that statements made on behalf of
a patent applicant during prosecution of the application to induce allowance of a patent
estop the patentee from later making assertions of patent coverage that are inconsistent
with the earlier statements). See, e.g., Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 130304 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Wang Labs, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
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An article of manufacture claim for a computer-implemented invention
shall be allowed only if a process or machine claim has been allowed to
the applicant in respect of the same disclosure. An article of manufacture claim will be allowed on a computer-readable information-storage
medium or device only when the subject matter claimed in the article of
manufacture claim satisfies each of the following conditions:
(1) the claimed subject matter is an encoding of the same computer program or algorithm that is implemented in the applicant's allowed process or machine claim; and
(2) each express or implied limitation as to claim scope, including, without limitation, those arising by reason of breadth of enablement, operability, description, and prior art, is made applicable to the article of
manufacture claim, taking into consideration that it is an article of
manufacture claim rather than a process or machine claim.
Administering such a rule could be problematic. There may be administrative burdens on the PTO, and comparable difficulties for persons
studying the issued claim for purposes of avoiding infringement or determining validity, in determining whether an article of manufacture claim,
as drafted, has all of the limitations of the related process or machine
claim.8 9 It would be desirable to have a simple and foolproof way, preferably one by rote, to meet these requirements-a "safe haven." It is believed that this result can be realized by a substitute for the foregoing
proposed regulation. The substitute would require that floppy disk
claims must in effect be dependent from (by making reference to) allowed
process or machine claims. This approach would automatically incorporate all limitations by reference, since that is the nature of a dependent
claim.90 It is preferable to have applicants refer to the allowed claims
than have them purport (but fail correctly) to regurgitate the full substantive content of the other claim in terms. 9 1 At least, the requirement
89. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In the Beauregardcase, for example, there was a parent case in which apparatus and process claims were allowed. Id. But
the claims in the floppy disk continuation case were worded differently, sometimes slightly
and sometimes very substantially, from those of the parent case. Id. That made it very
difficult to determine whether the floppy disk claims corresponded to allowable process or
apparatus subject matter in the allowed claims from the parent case. Id. This kind of
burden is likely to exist whenever floppy disk claims are written as independent claims. Id.
90. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 4 (1994) ("A claim in dependent form shall be construed to
incorporate by reference all limitations of the claim to which it refers."). Id.
91. A similar problem occurs whenever a dependent claim is allowable, but the base
claim from which it depends is not allowable. In such circumstances, the examiner is supposed to object to the dependent claim as dependent from a non-allowed base claim and
require the applicant to rewrite the dependent claim as an independent claim, incorporating into it all of the limitations found in the base and intervening claims. Ordinarily, some
editing and paraphrasing is necessary to merge the claims. Human error (doubtless inadvertent) at times occurs. As has been said in another context, it can be said of such claims
that "mistakes were made."
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of using a dependent claim format should be imposed unless an applicant
shows good cause why that rule should not apply to the applicant's
92
case.
Accordingly, the following regulation (or, in the alternative, statute)
is instead proposed for presentation of floppy disk claims in two
mandatory formats:
Mandatory format for certain article of manufacture claims
(a) An applicant may present for examination an article of manufacture
claim for a computer-implemented invention only in the formats described in this section, unless good cause is shown for not using those
formats.
(b) For purposes of this section and claims presented pursuant thereto,
the term "information storage medium" includes any information storage device, including, without limitation, a semiconductor integrated
circuit; and the term "claim environment" means the following, if it is or
they are recited in a claim to which reference is made:
Mistakes of this kind can even lead to charges of fraud or inequitable conduct. See
Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In
Kingsdown, a patent attorney, when carrying a claim forward into a continuation application, copied an incorrect, earlier version of the claim, which he had amended to overcome
an indefiniteness rejection. Id. In an en banc decision, the Federal Circuit held that under
the circumstances of the case, the negligence of the attorney in copying the language of the
claim did not manifest the specific intent to deceive the PTO requisite for a holding of
inequitable conduct. Id. Clearly, the patent system is better off when it creates fewer opportunities for scriveners' errors that may later affect substantive rights or, at the very
least, manufacture additional litigation issues.
92. It is conceivable that circumstances might exist in which no machine or process
claim had been allowed to the applicant, because of differences in inventorship or ownership of some aspects of the invention or as a result of some kind of estoppel. For that
reason, perhaps, an applicant should be allowed to show good cause why the requirement
could not be satisfied. Of course, it would not be a showing of good cause to point out that
the inventor had been allowed only a claim on a telegraph apparatus but felt entitled to a
floppy disk equivalent of a claim to the use of electromagnetic force for transmitting intelligible characters at any distance.
By way of comparison, the 1995 Biotechnological Process Patents amendment to § 103
of the patent code, adding a new subsection (b), provides that the otherwise obvious process
claim now allowed under this subsection must occur in the same patent application or in
one having the same effective filing date, as the related, nonobvious composition of matter;
and the two applications must be commonly owned. 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1)(A)-(B) and (2)(A)(B) (1994). Moreover, the claims must issue in the same patent or ones having the same
expiration dates. Id. The purpose of these provisions is different from that of the instant
provision, although the purposes of § 103(b) perhaps deserve attention here. Id. The limitations of § 103(b) are clearly intended to prevent extension of the duration of a patent
monopoly by double patenting and to limit harassment of potential defendants by multiple
patent owners. Id. Prof. Thomas refers to § 103 as attempting to "solve claiming problems
by bludgeon." Thomas, supra note 10. Perhaps, the "bludgeoning" criticism could be leveled at article of manufacture claims for computer programs, as well. Id. The intent of my
proposal, however, is to provide something of a safety helmet against the bludgeon.
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(1) the intended use of the subject matter of the claim to which reference is made;
(2) the apparatus environment of the subject matter of the claim to
which reference is made; and
(3) the physical parameters of which input signals to the subject matter
of the claim to which reference is made are representative.
(c) The following format may be used when reference is made to an allowed apparatus claim: An information storage medium encoded with
machine-readable computer-program code, to be used, in the claim environment of [apparatus] Claim A, for implementing the following means
of Claim A [names for elements are illustrative only]:
said first means;
said means for adding;
said multiplier means; and
said subtraction means.
(d) The following format may be used when reference is made to an allowed process claim: An information storage medium encoded with
machine-readable computer-program code, to be used, in the claim environment of [process] Claim P, for carrying out steps m to n of Claim P.
Here, Claims A and P are to be understood as allowable apparatus
and process claims, where the claimed subject matter utilizes an algorithm to carry out the patentable process or apparatus. Immaterial
variations in wording, such as an introductory phrase of the kind "an
article of manufacture comprising" or "an article of manufacture essentially consisting of," would be unobjectionable. The point is that claims
in this format are to guarantee no difference in substance as to the scope
of use between the article of manufacture claim and a related process or
93
apparatus claim on which it purports to be based.
The two formats proposed would lead to floppy disk claims that have
the same scope and limitations as the allowed, related machine and process claims, taking into account that a claim according to the prescribed
format is directed only to the portion of the system involved that is a
computer program encoded on a storage medium. These formats would
not cover unenabled, undescribed uses or uses outside the environment
that conferred patentability on the antecedent machine and process
claims to which they relate. Accordingly, the proposed formats would
93. A further advantage of such claims would be that the examiner would not need to
spend any time examining them. Such a claim should be allowed as a matter of course.
Thomas, supra note 10 (quoting claims from a 1995 patent that are drafted in essentially
this format reads, "Claim 15. A program storage device readable by machine, tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the machine to perform the method steps
of Claim 13.").
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appear to solve the scope problems that floppy disk claims would otherwise cause.
While this discussion has referred to this type of claim as a dependent claim, strictly speaking it is not a dependent claim. It does not contain all the elements or limitations of the claim to which it refers, since it
is really directed to only a part of the entire system-the part embodying
the relevant computer program. 94 However, as formulated here, the
floppy disk claim cannot be infringed by a use, or a manufacture or sale
or offer to sell for a use, other than that which will occur when the independent base claim is infringed. The proposed claim format is akin to
that of a "hybrid" claim on the product of a process. 9 5 In both cases, the
later claim refers to an allowed base claim, and the base claim limits and
describes the subject matter of the later claim in much the same way as
the preamble of a Jepson claim 96 limits the scope of the rest of the
97
claim.
3.

Extrapolation to PropagatedSignals
It may be premature to address the same problem in terms of propa-

94. Consider an invention of a notional gasoline engine, which is the subject of notional
Claim 1. This engine has greatly superior functionality (more complete conversion of fuel
into mechanical energy and less production of pollutants) because it combusts gasoline vapor divided into smaller size particles than previously used. A conventional carburetor can
be modified to produce the smaller particle just by decreasing the diameter of an orifice.
Other structural modifications of the engine involve a different piston shape and a hotter
spark plug, and the engine of Claim 1 has such limitations.
A carburetor for use in the engine might be claimed in reference to the engine, somewhat like certain European pharmaceutical claims ("for use in the engine of Claim 1").
This carburetor would not literally have any of the piston or spark plug limitations of the
engine, because a carburetor contains no pistons or spark plugs. Nonetheless, the carburetor claim would not be infringed by use of a narrow-orifice carburetor with an engine different from that of Claim 1, such as an engine with different pistons or spark plugs. The
situation is comparable to that of the floppy disk claim format proposed in this article.
95. See generally Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (providing an extensive discussion of scope of product-by-process claims).
96. See Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 1997 WL 574561, *5 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing Jepson claims).
97. Id. Claims in this format may be compared, also, with the claims that 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(b) authorizes. Id. That provision meets the special needs of the biotechnology industry. See supra note 92. Subsection (b) addresses a well-known biotechnology process that
has been adapted to use a novel, nonobvious starting product, or to produce a novel, nonobvious end product. 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1994). Before enactment of § 103(b), the adapted
process would have been held obvious. Id. Under § 103(b), if such a product is patentable
so too is the process, as adapted for the new product. Id. The present proposal for floppy
disk claims reflects an inverse situation: where a computer-implemented process is patentable, a conventionally encoded conventional floppy disk used to carry out the process becomes patentable, as adapted.
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gated signal claims. 98 So far, they seem to be purely hypothetical. However, possible claim formats are like Mount Everest to patent attorneys.
That they might be there is enough to present a challenge. It is therefore
worth considering, at least tentatively, whether the preceding mechanisms would help limit the possible overbreadth of such claims.
If anything, the overbreadth problem is potentially more serious for
propagated signal claims than it is for claims directed to a tangible storage medium or device. At least in some instances, the nature of an application places limits on the range of equivalents that a tangible medium
claim would receive. It has already been suggested, for example, that a
pattern recognition algorithm may be enabled for a check verification
system by a floppy disk disclosure and not be enabled for space vehicle
navigation purposes by the same disclosure. 99 This kind of consideration
might well lead a court to limit the scope of a floppy disk claim enabled
by a floppy disk disclosure to applications using floppy disks and similar
slow, non-rugged media, even absent the claim format requirements that
this article proposes. 10 0 But it is not clear that the kind of environment
or field of use constraints that might limit the enablement and scope of a
tangible medium claim will apply to a signal. It may be that "a signal is
a signal is a signal," in that they all look alike.
Recognition of propagated signal claims could thus cause significantly greater damage to the balance between enablement and claim
scope that existing patent law provides than floppy disk claims. Signal
claims bring us much closer to Morse's Claim 8-speaking literallythan other claim formats have done. By the same token, it is even more
important that limitations akin to those proposed for floppy disk claims
should apply to propagated signal claims.
If we are to have propagated signal claims, then, they should be limited in terms to the environment of the apparatus or process claims on
which they are based, and thus to the enabling disclosure behind them.
Accordingly, if a signal is to be deemed in the same category as an "information storage medium" for purposes of article of manufacture claims to
computer software, the required formats of paragraphs (c) and (d) proposed earlier' 0 1 should govern them too. Imposing that format requirement on propagated signal claims would go far to remove the risk of
overbreadth that signal claims would otherwise pose.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19.
99. See supra text accompanying note 70.
100. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (holding that no patent infringement occurred where patent specification disclosed
one structure and accused machine had a "significantly different" structure).
101. See supra text accompanying and subsequent to note 90.
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RULEMAKING OR LEGISLATION?

A remaining question is whether what has been proposed here for
the rationalization of floppy disk claims can be accomplished through the
Commissioner's rulemaking power or must instead be the subject of a
statutory amendment. Analysis of this question has several branches. A
first branch is whether the Commissioner could properly decline to examine article of manufacture claims unless they were in the proposed
format. A second branch of the question is whether the Commissioner
has power to allow such claims. Stated differently, the proposed regulations invite the questions of whether they go too far and whether they do
not go far enough in allowing article of manufacture claims.
Two precedents have a substantial bearing on the questions. In
Steinmetz v. Allen, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent office rule
against combining method and apparatus claims in the same patent application. 10 2 The Court found the requirement irrational and therefore
struck it down. In Application of Tarczy-Hornoch, the predecessor of the
Federal Circuit struck down the patent office's rule against allowing process claims to the inherent function of a patented machine that was covered by an allowable apparatus claim. 10 3 In both cases, the reviewing
court considered the patent office's rule irrational in terms of applicable
substantive law.
Thus, one determinative question is whether existing substantive
patent law allows a patent to a computer program article of manufacture
claim where the law would not allow a corresponding apparatus or process claim. If it does, the proposed regulation does not go far enough,

and an applicant denied a claim because of the proposed regulation
would have a legitimate grievance. Presumably, the Federal Circuit
would then overturn (at least, vacate) a rejection based on the
regulation.104

No one has suggested that an article of manufacture claim should be
allowed except as an adjunct to and supplement for an allowable apparatus or process claim. 10 5 Such moderation in the demands of enthusiasts

for such claims seems warranted, to say the least. For example, deci102. Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U.S. 543 (1904).
103. In re Application of Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
104. Of course, in the case of a statute no such issue arises. See Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (stating that Congress is free to legislate short of the maximum
established by the Constitution). The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact patent legislation but does not compel Congress to exercise the power in any particular way or
to any particular extent, so long as Congress acts within the limits of that grant. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908); Wheaton v. Peters, 34 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (providing comparable rulings as to
copyright laws).
105. See, e.g., Siber and Dawkins, supra note 5, at 260-61.
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sions such as In re Gulack 10 6 make it clear that a claim to an article
whose sole novelty is the information embodied in the article must, to be
patented, rest on a novel, nonobvious interaction between the old substrate and the new information. The only new result claimed for the subject matter of floppy disk patents is that they make a computer system
operate in a novel, nonobvious way. The grounds for patentability of the
floppy disk and the computer apparatus or the computer process are thus
the same. There is no reasonable substantive basis for allowing a floppy
disk claim to a supposed invention that does not qualify for patenting as
an apparatus or process. For that reason, it seems fair to conclude that
the proposal does not fall short of the full proper scope that article of
10 7
manufacture claims deserve under present law.
The first branch of the analysis thus leads to the conclusion that the
Commissioner would be justified in refusing to grant claims to articles of
manufacture where no corresponding apparatus or process would be patentable. The only question on judicial review of the rule-say, on a direct appeal of a rejection based on the rule-then would be whether the
proposed rule has a reasonable relationship to the foregoing principle of
law.10 8 Clearly, it does.
To be sure, other means for complying with present law might be
devised. But the Commissioner may promulgate any regulations "not inconsistent with law" relating to how proceedings shall be conducted
before the PTO. 10 9 As long as the regulations are not inconsistent with
law, it is immaterial that other possible formulations of the regulations
would also be not inconsistent with law. It is enough that the Commissioner's rules are not arbitrary or capricious, 110 or otherwise "in excess of
statutory authority.""' Regulations will be sustained so long as they
112
are "reasonably related to the purposes of' the underlying legislation.
That test is met here.
The second branch of the question-whether the proposal goes too
far-is more problematic. It may be that such article of manufacture
claims are necessarily invalid under § 101 or § 103. When the comparable question arose for biotechnology inventions-manufacture of a new
product by adapting a known process or manufacture of a new or known
product by adapting a known process to use of a different and novel
starting material-the controversy was resolved only by amending the
106. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. (1983).
107. See Guidelines, supra note 4 (whether my proposal goes too far, and whether the
PTO's Guidelines go too far, are separate questions).
108. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).
110. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1994).
112. Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1425.
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statute to obviate the obstacles in existing law. This article does not attempt to resolve the fundamental question of whether article of manufacture claims for computer program subject matter are inherently
misconceived. That is the subject of a different contribution to this symposium.1 13 Without purporting to resolve that issue, this article simply
pretermits the question and awaits the learning to be gained from the
contributions of others to this symposium. As stated at the outset, it is
assumed here, arguendo, that some kind of article of manufacture (floppy
disk) claim would be lawful; this analysis addresses only the questionwhat kind of claim should it be or would it have to be. This article has
set out to determine the problems, other than that of statutory subject
matter and related issues ofpolicy, that floppy disk claims pose, and then
seek solutions to each of them.
For these reasons, it is concluded that promulgating the two regulations proposed here are within the Commissioner's rulemaking power.
The proposed regulations simply restate the present state of law and
give a reasonable mechanism for complying with the law's requirements.1 1 4 If I am incorrect in this analysis, nonetheless, Congress
clearly has the power to enact such legislation. The Constitution neither
requires Congress to go farther than these proposed regulations or statutory provisions, nor does it withhold from Congress power to enact them.
If one assumes that there should be floppy disk claims of some kind, the
Guidelines proposed here for their format appear most likely to ensure
that granting floppy disk claims will do minimum damage to the other
goals of the patent system.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Floppy disk claims can be rationalized in a manner that overcomes
the O'Reilly v. Morse problems that claims in this format tend to create.
The rationalization is accomplished by importing into floppy disk claims
the same kind of limitations that courts have held confer patentability on
machine and process claims directed to software inventions. While
floppy disk subject matter may resist imposition of such limitations,
given that a floppy disk does not "care" what problem a computer uses
the program encoded on the disk to solve, the necessary limitations can
be imposed on floppy disk claims by regulatory or legislative fiat. A
mechanism for doing that has now been proposed. It is believed that the
proposed mechanism would further the public interest in avoiding overbreadth, because it makes the scope of such claims substantially
equivalent to that of allowable process or apparatus claims on which
113. Thomas, supra note 10.
114. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 927 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (administrative agency's rule-making authority as "interpretative" rather than "substantive").
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they are based. It is also believed that the proposed format requirements
will result in minimizing the administrative and interpretative problems
that floppy disk claims would otherwise cause for the PTO and the business community.

